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Naturalism and Anti-Naturalism in Nietzsche
A BSTR ACT :   Nietzsche has been associated with naturalism due to his arguments that mo-
rality, religion, metaphysics, and consciousness are products of natural biological organisms 
and ultimately natural phenomena. Th e subject and its mental life are only comprehensible 
in relation to natural desires, drives, impulses, and instincts. I argue that such typical natu-
ralizing tendencies do not exhaust Nietzsche’s project, since they occur in the context of 
his critique of “nature” and metaphysical, speculative, and scientifi c naturalisms. Nietzsche 
challenges otherworldly projections of this-worldly beings, as his naturalistic interpreters 
claim, but further the idolization of immanent worldly natural phenomena, including sci-
ence itself. “Nature” is an idealization of natural organisms and environments in which its 
construction, projection, and interpretation is forgotten. Nietzsche strategically uses natu-
ralistic scientifi c strategies of explanation and demystifi cation, while demystifying science, 
positivism, and naturalism for the sake of life. Th ese do not provide either certainties or 
foundations for knowledge or life. Naturalism would be anti-natural if it denies of multi-
plicity and confl ict of the forces of life, bracketing the natural and historical conditions of 
existence, and the interpretive and perspectival character of life and knowledge. Th e nexus 
of nature and history in Nietzsche is better clarifi ed through his portrayal of the feeling 
of life and its intensifi cation, attenuation, and transformation in relation to the forces and 
conditions of life, which encompass processes of socialization and interpretive and artistic 
individuation in the context of a life.
K EY WOR DS:   Nietzsche • naturalism • anti-naturalism • philosophy of life
1. Introduction: Between Naturalism and Constructivism1
Two prevalent – and, as I hope to show, insuffi  cient and one-dimensional –readings of Friedrich Nietzsche’s mature philosophical thought is that 
it is either primarily naturalistic or radically constructivist2. On the one hand, 
1  References are to the pages of Friedrich Nietzsche, Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studien-
ausgabe in 15 Bänden, ed. G. Colli und M. Montinari [KSA], Berlin / München / New York 
1980. I use the following translations: Za = Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke Zarathustra, 
Oxford 2005; TI = Twilight of the Idols, Indianapolis 1997; GM = Genealogy of Morality, 
Indianapolis, 1998; GS = The Gay Science; BGE = Beyond Good and Evil, Oxford 1998; 
UM = Untimely Meditations, Cambridge 1983.
2  For instance, respectively, B. Leiter, Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Nietzsche on 
Morality (London 2002), 6, and T. Murphy, Nietzsche, Metaphor, Religion (Albany 2001), 
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naturalistic readers of Nietzsche emphasize how he explicated and evaluated 
human phenomena through recourse to the drives, forces, and powers of life 
and nature and utilized ideas, metaphors, and strategies from the biological 
and physiological sciences of his day. Nietzsche advocated the value of the 
modern sciences, albeit critically, conditionally, and while calling for the 
further radicalization of their experimental character. His ongoing concern 
with questions of natural sciences, biological life, and effi  cient causality – 
which he skeptically interrogated while maintaining the conditional and 
interdependent character of agents and systems – appears to be at odds with 
interpretations that would bracket, suspend, or disregard them3.
On the other hand, constructivists argue for the primacy of the 
constitution of meaning. Constructivist interpreters of Nietzsche’s writings 
focus on Nietzsche’s style and the contingent creation of conditional and 
relative meanings. Nietzsche’s articulation of the fecundity, singularity, and 
multiplicity of lived-experiences is interpreted through how he unveiled 
the perspectival, interpretive, and constructed character of nature, life, and 
scientifi c inquiry. It is, aft er all, only through active interpretive forces that 
seeing becomes the seeing of something4. Nietzsche’s elucidation and reli-
ance on strategies of art and interpretation contrast with the more reductive 
tactics typical of naturalism and positivism that he critically diagnosed for 
their latent metaphysical impulses and symptoms5.
Discourses and practices of the true, the good, the sacred, and the 
beautiful are not simply untrue or ruled out as illegitimate by Nietzsche, 
as they are for such scientifi cally-oriented philosophies. Nietzsche instead 
exposed and evaluated discourses and practices as social-historical sedimen-
tations of transitory feelings, value-judgments, and not always obvious ex-
ercises of power6. Despite Nietzsche’s reliance on notions of nature, life, and 
causality in critiquing how these very notions are used and appropriated, 
and even though he did not idealistically abandon the empiricity (Empirie), 
materiality, and worldly resistance that confront and resist individuals and 
social-formations, Nietzsche is taken to be a thorough-going anti-naturalist 
189. On the tensions between naturalistic and constructivist approaches to Nietzsche, see: 
T. Shaw, Nietzsche’s Political Skepticism (Princeton 2007), pp.102–103.
3  Nietzsche explicitly rejected the possibility of such suspensions and neutralizations of 
judgment and valuing in, for instance, Nietzsche, KSA 3: 518, 535; GS, 219, 236.
4  Nietzsche, GM, III.12.
5  On the “metaphysical faith” characteristic of the ideology of modern science, see Ni-
etzsche, KSA 3: 577; GS, 344 and KSA 5: 398–401 and GM, III.24.
6  On power and suff ering in Nietzsche, see E. S. Nelson, Priestly Power and Damaged 
Life in Nietzsche and Adorno, [in:] Nietzsche: Philosoph der Kultur(en)? / Philosopher of 
Culture?, ed. A.U. Sommer, Berlin 2008, pp. 349–356.
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insofar as the world becomes a play of the will or the subject, or a relative 
projection of society, power, and language.
Both of these readings obviously draw on sources expressed within 
Nietzsche’s works. Taken together, they indicate an impasse or incoherence 
in reading Nietzsche as a philosopher. An alternative to these two signifi cant 
yet ultimately monolithic and essentialist approaches, and their permuta-
tions that reduce the nexus of self and world to mere natural, subjective, and/
or social processes, is to interpret both strategies exhibited in Nietzsche’s 
works more seriously. Each is insuffi  cient to a thinking that critiques ideolo-
gies of science, nature, and life, while retaining their resistance and critical 
transformative impulses against traditional metaphysics and abstract specu-
lative thought.
To introduce a preliminary example, Nietzsche neither portrays the 
drives and instincts as either socially unalterable biological facts of a fi xed 
or underlying nature or essence nor can they be exclusive determinations 
or constructions of history, language, and society. While biological drives 
are transformed via interpretive processes of individuation and socializa-
tion, particularly radically in morality and religion, they in turn impact, 
infl uence, and potentially resist these processes. Values are symptoms of the 
body in Nietzsche’s physiological argumentation; yet this is not a relation of 
essence and contingent accident, the value expresses and reconfi gures bodily 
forces and their nexus and hence can produce its own ill eff ects7. Prefi guring 
Plessner’s bio-hermeneutics in this respect, Nietzsche shows how the body is 
already interpretive of itself and its environment. Th e body is not prior to or 
outside of the mediation of interpretation8.
As life is an impure and monstrous mixture of confl icting forces and 
interpretations, which constitute not bare life but “a life”, Nietzsche unfolds 
in his middle-works a project of “natural history” (Naturgeschichte), which 
later becomes genealogy, in the context of an interpretive hermeneutics of 
nature that diverges from both the constructivist and naturalistic approaches 
that refl ect dominant yet problematic tendencies in twentieth century and 
contemporary philosophy9.
7  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 348–349; GS, 33.
8  Although its interpretive character should not lead to neglecting the body’s materiality, 
the body as a metaphor of interpretation has been articulated by E. Blondel, Nietzsche, the 
Body and Culture: Philosophy as a Philological Genealogy, Stanford 1991, p. 219.
9  On interpreting Naturgeschichte as critical history or genealogy see, for instance, Ni-
etzsche, KSA 3: 100.
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2. Nietzsche and the Naturalistic Overcoming of Naturalism
In Nietzsche’s middle period, the question of nature is tied to the issue of 
“the perspectival optics of life” (die Perspektiven-Optik des Lebens) and 
perspectival assessments and probabilities (perspektivischer Schätzungen 
und Scheinbarkeiten) without which there would be no life (es bestünde gar 
kein Leben), as humans identify what is nature with their own power and 
projection and declare this to be natural10. Nevertheless, Nietzsche is not a 
thinker who simply asserts the self-assertion of the human, the anthropo-
centrism that believes only human truths. Instead, he can – as he does in 
section 333 of Dawn – use the images of nature and animals critically to 
place all too human and limited points of view into question and reveal dif-
ferent perspectives and horizons in order to throw this priority and prejudice 
into question:
‘Humanity’. – We do not regard the animals as moral beings. But do 
you suppose the animals regard us as moral beings? – An animal which 
could speak said: ‘Humanity is a prejudice of which we animals at least 
are free’ (Daybreak 333)11.
In section 109 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche himself mentioned the 
need to “naturalize humans”: “When will all these shadows of God cease 
to darken our minds? When will we complete our de-deifi cation of nature? 
When may we begin to “naturalize” humanity in terms of a pure, newly 
discovered, newly redeemed nature? (The Gay Science, 109)12. One transla-
tor of this passage, Walter Kaufmann, notes that it signifi es naturalism in 
contrast with the supernatural, as a kind of emancipatory disenchantment 
or secularization of human life and its world13. Such remarks in favor of 
naturalization in response to the shadows of God that darken and obscure 
our minds and existence are not unfamiliar from Nietzsche’s works. Yet, it is 
worthwhile to consider whether we can clarify the sense of this naturaliza-
tion at work here and whether it constitutes naturalism. Is it, for example, 
the naturalism as “interpretive holism” that Christoph Cox proposed, or 
10  Nietzsche, KSA 5: 53.
11  “‘Menschlichkeit.’ – Wir halten die Th iere nicht für moralische Wesen. Aber meint ihr 
denn, dass die Th iere uns für moralische Wesen halten? – Ein Th ier, welches reden konnte, 
sagte: ‘Menschlichkeit ist ein Vorurtheil, an dem wenigstens wir Th iere nicht leiden.’” 
Nietzsche, KSA 3: 234; also note KSA 3: 510.
12  “Wann warden wir die Natur ganz entgöttlicht haben! Wann warden wir anfangen dür-
fen, uns Menschen mit der reinen, neu gefundenen, neu erlösten Natur zu vernatürlichen!” 
Nietzsche, KSA 3: 469; GS, 169.
13  W. Kaufmann, GS, 169.
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the speculative, methodological, and anti-realistic naturalism promoted by 
Brian Leiter14?
While Nietzsche concluded this passage by evoking “newly redeemed 
nature” (neu erlösten Natur)15, he began it by critiquing two apparently 
confl icting approaches to nature. Nietzsche warns against thinking that the 
world is a living being, an effi  cient machine, or an elegant cyclical movement. 
Th ese aspects are the exceptions, favored by anthropomorphism, whereas 
nature is chaos and labyrinth:
Th e total character of the world, however, is in all eternity chaos-in 
the sense not of a lack of necessity but a lack of order, arrangement, 
form, beauty, wisdom, and whatever names there are for our aesthetic 
anthropomorphisms (The Gay Science, 109)16.
Th e eternal chaos of the natural world follows the necessity of its own de-
terminations without purposes or instincts, and without underlying laws 
and order17. Th e world is in this perspective not a collection of substances 
or atoms, whether material or spiritual units, nor is it one comprehensive 
whole. Nietzsche’s strategies of “naturalization” do not lead back to one 
determinate systematic order of nature, whether this “nature” is conceived 
as metaphysical, poetic, or scientifi c.
Accordingly, earlier in poem 55, speaking of the naturalistic painters 
who demand that their works be “true to nature” (Treu die Natur) Nietzsche 
points out “the infi nity of nature’s smallest part” (Unendlich ist das kleinste 
Stück der Welt) and that therefore what they depict is not nature’s truth 
but their own delight according to their own abilities18. Even in regard to 
the sciences, Nietzsche argued that we only capture what allows itself to 
be captured and natural worlds multiply further than our anthropocentric 
14  Ch. Cox, Nietzsche: Naturalism and Interpretation, Berkeley 1999, p. 114; B. Leiter and 
N. Sinhababu, Nietzsche and Morality, Oxford 2007, p. 195. Also compare B. Leiter, 
Nietzsche on Morality, London 2002; B. Leiter, Nietzsche’s Naturalism Reconsidered, 
[in:] K. Gemes and J. Richardson, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Nietzsche, Oxford 
2009.
15  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 469; GS, 169.
16  „Der Gesamt-Charakter der Welt ist dagegen in alle Ewigkeit Chaos, nicht im Sinne der 
fehlenden Notwendigkeit, sondern der fehlenden Ordnung, Gliederung, Form, Schönheit, 
Weisheit, und wie alle unsere ästhetischen Menschlichkeiten heißen.” Nietzsche, KSA 3: 
469; GS, 169. On Nietzsche’s thinking of chaos, compare Martin Heidegger, GA 44: Nietz-
sches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendlä ndischen Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr 
des Gleichen, Frankfurt am Main 1986, p. 101.
17  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 467–468, 552; GS, 167–168, 254.
18  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 365; GS, 65.
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perceptual and conceptual horizons can enclose19. Th e dynamic infi nite in 
nature’s smallest detail does not only then extend beyond the power and 
insight of the painter; it escapes and eludes the scientist and the naturalistic 
scientistic philosopher.
Given that the awareness of the precariousness, uncertainty, and need 
to go further and overturn itself is what distinguishes scientifi c practice 
from morality, metaphysics, and religion, the scientist falsifi es the experi-
mental interpretive character of the sciences, which are a virtue of science as 
much as of art for Nietzsche, by treating them as fi xed or absolute. Th rough 
experimentalism, art transforms the nature with which it is continuous, at 
the same time as Nietzsche warns us to beware of becoming a mere actor in 
this process20.
To the extent that Nietzsche can be described as committed to sci-
entism or positivism at all, it is of a peculiar sort that undermines their 
paradigmatic interpretation. Nietzsche’s advocacy of science challenges it 
insofar as he praises science as experimentation through replaceable false-
hoods, and frequently critiques its role in modernity. Nietzsche’s ostensible 
naturalism likewise fundamentally problematized the reifi ed image of na-
ture presupposed by conventional naturalisms. Nietzsche utilized reductive 
naturalistic strategies and yet in a fundamental sense there is no common 
or defi nitive nature on which to base or defi ne naturalism as a doctrinal 
or methodological truth about nature. Nietzsche’s naturalizing tendencies 
do not exhaust his project insofar as it does not only involve appeals to 
nature but a critique of ideologies of nature, whether they are metaphysical, 
romantic, or scientifi c.
To the degree that Nietzsche is more of an epistemic anarchist who 
adopted a variety of methods, rather than a follower of one defi nitive method 
or style of philosophizing, his naturalization of truth and nature eliminates 
the prospect of naturalism in any conventional sense as a truth about the 
world or as a method. Naturalism is an argumentative strategy; it is one 
value and perspective among many in the shift ing weaving of perspectives 
enacted in his writing.
3. Generative Nature: Beyond Constructivism and Naturalism?
Nietzsche explicitly maintained in The Gay Science the constructed and 
fallible character of our conception of nature and life:
19  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 110.
20  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 596; GS, 303.
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We have arranged for ourselves a world in which we can live – by 
positing bodies, lines, planes, causes and eff ects, motion and rest, form 
and content; without these articles of faith nobody could now endure 
life. But that does not prove them. Life is no argument. Th e conditions 
of life might include error. (The Gay Science, 121).
Conscious life is a fantastic commentary on an unknown even if 
somehow felt text.21 Th e derivative and illusive character of consciousness 
and of a subject that believes it has self-knowledge is a well-known theme 
for Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s descriptions of the body as a confl ict of drives and 
forces unknown to our pre-refl ective awareness indicates how challenging 
Nietzsche’s materialism is for the idealistic premises of phenomenology and 
its “anchored subject” of a refl exively self-aware consciousness, “the” body, 
or being-in-the-world. Genealogical natural history breaks through the illu-
sions of constitutive subjectivity. As origins are fortuitous and impure, there 
is no return to pure origins in consciousness, will, bodily fl esh, or event of 
being. Such concepts can only be demystifi ed by being referred back to their 
worldly constitution and natural-historical conditions.
Nietzsche’s skeptical critique of ordinary causal reasoning evoke the 
phenomenological critique of causality. But these criticisms undermine the 
teleological interpretation of causality, they do not lead him to the suspension 
of the causal—and hence conditional and contingent – empirical aff airs in 
which each embodied natural-historical agent is intertwined and dispersed. 
Th e unity of the phenomenological ātman disappears across discontinuous 
causal moments, and insight into the origin reveals how unoriginal and 
dependent it is22.
Given the contingent causal conditions of life, Nietzsche calls for a 
joyful science of experimentation with the changing conditions of life rather 
than the suspension of empirical factical judgment. Th is joyful playful sci-
ence includes Nietzsche’s account of time in Thus Spoke Zarathustra. Several 
readers – most notably, Martin Heidegger in his interpretation of Nietzsche 
as the “last metaphysician” of the West who signifi es the culmination rather 
than the overcoming of metaphysics – interpret Nietzsche’s temporality 
positively or negatively as a reassertion of metaphysics23. Nietzsche, however, 
21  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 113.
22  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 52.
23  For the fuller context of Heidegger’s reading of and oft en troublesome relationship with 
Nietzsche, see R. Bernasconi, Heidegger, Nietzsche, National Socialism: The Place of 
Metaphysics in the Political Debate of the 1930s and U. Haase, Heidegger and Nietzsche, 
[in:] F. Raff oul and E. S. Nelson, eds., Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger, London 2013, 
pp. 47–53, 121–128.
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contrasts cyclical and linear time in order to suggest a cosmological reaffi  r-
mation of a life – namely, one’s own life – in its contingency and multiplicity. 
Th e eternal return of the same, as Paul S. Loeb recently shown, is a cosmic 
thesis that entails an immanent perspectival cyclical temporality rather than 
reaffi  rming the external time articulated in the conventional understanding 
of time found in both science and traditional metaphysics24.
Nietzsche’s exploration of new seas (nach neuen Meeren), his 
condition-oriented experimentalism, has been interpreted as part of his 
“happy positivism”. Positivism is not the opposite of hermeneutics as it is 
sometimes claimed to be, since some of its forms—such as that of the early 
Carnap – emphasize the importance of the construction and interpretation 
of experience for the sciences. Carnap, who was a reader of Nietzsche in the 
1920’s, is not far from Nietzsche’s claim that: “even physics is only a way of 
interpreting or arranging the world (if I may say so: according to us!) and not 
a way of explaining the world”25.
Nevertheless, where Nietzsche and logical positivism diff er is on ques-
tions of value and its neutralization. While promoting science is linked with 
the general project of enlightened culture and progressive politics in Carnap 
and Neurath, it is not connected to the particular methods and contents of 
scientifi c inquiry. For both, science and nature are without teleology and will 
as an essence or substance, to the degree that Nietzsche criticizes Spinoza for 
being still too teleological, and yet for Nietzsche life is inseparable from its 
valuing and being valued26.
Nietzsche could write in the Gay Science that all experience is inher-
ently moral27. All experience including sense perception, Nietzsche claimed, 
is already moral evaluative28. Th is holds for theory as well. Th is entails that 
interpretation is not a neutral pragmatics of the best available arguments, 
theories, and truths, as such pragmatics already presupposes an answer to 
the question of what is valued, how much it is valued, and what is not.
In spite of Nietzsche’s ardent polemics against ethics and morality, 
Nietzsche is a deeply ethical thinker in interpreting human existence through 
the lenses of moral questions if not traditional moral answers. Th ese lenses 
are focused not only on what supposedly deviates from nature but on what 
appeals to nature as if nature provided an absolute essence, norm, or standard.
24  Compare P. S. Loeb, The Death of Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, Cambridge 2010.
25  „dass Physik auch nur eine Welt-Auslegung und –Zurechtlegung (nach uns! mit Verlaub 
gesagt) und nicht eine Welt- Erklärung ist.” Nietzsche, KSA 5: 28; BGE, §14.
26  Nietzsche, KSA 5; BGE, 95, 152–153.
27  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 114; GS, 174.
28  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 114; GS, 174.
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4. Living according to Nature?
In Beyond Good and Evil, §9, Nietzsche’s examines the Hellenistic-Roman 
idea of “living according to nature,” asking “Do you love nature? You want 
to live ‘according to nature’? O you noble Stoics, what fraudulent words!” 
Both the Stoics and Epicureans appealed to this idea and yet ended up with 
a diff erent conception of nature and what living according to it might mean. 
Nietzsche noted again that nature is reduced to what one desires it to be, as 
a Stoic or Epicurean29.
Th e idea of living according to nature is an idealization of nature 
that involves forgetting that nature and living naturally are constructions, 
projections, and interpretations. Nietzsche commented that there is in fact 
nothing less natural than the nature of such philosophers, who ascetically, 
moralistically, and later romantically read their own conditions and feeling 
of life into nature. Humans do not live according to nature, as he remarked 
in Dawn, they imagine themselves into it30. Such an imperative remains an 
empty tautology, as he argued in Beyond Good and Evil, §9, unless one gives 
nature and life a value;
And supposing your imperative ‘live according to nature’ meant at 
bottom as much as ‘live according to life’ – how can you not do that? 
Why make a principle of what you yourselves are and must be31?
Nietzsche does not only assess God, the True, and the Good as oth-
erworldly projections of this-worldly beings. He simultaneously rejected 
appeals to immanent worldly phenomena made into ideals, such as nature 
in the Stoics, natural law theory, Rousseau, and Wagner, and also in the 
naturalistic and positivistic philosophies of his times that are still beholden 
to the compulsion of metaphysical need32.
Th ere are no facts only interpretations, Nietzsche remarked, and 
nature has been revealed as another human construct and as – to use a non-
Nietzschean word – ideological. Th is cannot be the last word, however, since 
– as seen earlier – Nietzsche insisted that infi nite chaotic nature extends 
beyond human thought and activity and has impulses that resist and upset 
the projects and constructs of conventional human anthropomorphism.
29  Nietzsche, KSA 5:22; BGE, §9.
30  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 29; D, 17.
31  „Und gesetzt, euer Imperativ ‚gemäss der Natur leben’ bedeute im Grunde soviel als ‚ge-
mäss dem Leben leben’ – wie könntet ihr’s denn nicht? Wozu ein Princip aus dem machen, 
was ihr selbst seid und sein müsst?” Nietzsche, KSA5: 22; BGE, §9.
32  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 581; GS, 288.
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5. Natural Histories
As Nietzsche repeatedly argued, including in his most positivistic period, 
there is no independent nature in itself that could free it or us from our in-
terpretations, interests, and evaluations of value33. Our “nature” is to artfully 
pick and choose, value and devalue, and rank and transformatively order 
and reorder, even as “nature” is in itself neither good nor evil for Nietzsche34. 
Nevertheless, this valuing does not occur out of free will or in the transpa-
rency of consciousness that Nietzsche deconstructed as fi ctional entities35. 
Interpretation is neither arbitrary nor infi nite; it is shadowed by an ape, and 
physiologically and social-historically circumscribed and conditioned.
Consequently, all our attitudes about nature are rooted in human 
instincts and drives that have codifi ed and rearranged previous experiences 
and feelings of natural phenomena. Nietzsche described in Dawn how our 
contemporary feelings of natural beauty and joy and wonder in nature are 
explicable only as interconnected with and rooted in a history of fear36. 
Knowledge and feelings of nature are not spontaneous aff ects; they are 
historical formations repeatedly shaped and reshaped by biological and en-
vironmental circumstances. Th ey are the stratifi ed, oft en stagnated, yet alter-
able remnants of previous reactions and responses to natural phenomena of 
which present action and contemplation are neither free nor disinterested37.
Although humans act out of specifi c feelings of nature and life, of 
a specifi c confi guration of forces that can be called the will to power, this 
explanation of human activity is not an endorsement of its truth or value 
insofar as it is constitutively and necessarily unreliable38.
As remnants of the history of the species and of lineages, passions, 
instincts, and drives are the impure mixture of nature and history, they 
can therefore only be addressed as and through “natural history” (Naturge-
schichte), which is a phrase Nietzsche periodically uses, especially in his 
middle works39. Th e conceptions of Naturgeschichte in both its Marxist and 
Nietzschean varieties critically oppose ideologies that essentialize and reify 
nature and materiality or society and mind. Natural history does not only 
examine nature or physics and culture or society as isolated realities, but 
precisely how nature is inevitably socialized and individuated in the life of 
33  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 51, 190.
34  Nietzsche, KSA 3: respectively, 92 and 29–30, 171.
35  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 119.
36  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 134.
37  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 134.
38  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 136.
39  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 100, 378.
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groups and individuals and how social-cultural life is constituted in relation 
to its bodily, environmental, and material life. Th is is the locus where what 
Nietzsche earlier called “critical history” and later “genealogy” needs to oc-
cur40. It addresses humanity’s reptilian morals as much as its highest ideals 
through which humanity likes to imagine itself.
Nietzsche critiqued purely critical history in the Untimely Medita-
tions and nonetheless developed radical strategies and models of critique 
that negate in order to affi  rm41. Th is importantly included the critique of the 
slanderers of nature for the sake of the affi  rmation of nature – not as essence 
or ideal but as the conditional circumstances and conditions of life42. It is this 
sense of nature in contrast with anti-nature that Nietzsche can speak criti-
cally of the lack of style and “Jesuitism” of naturalism, but in other passages 
more positively of “naturalism”:
I formulate a principle. All naturalism in morality, that is all healthy 
morality, is dominated by an instinct of life – some commandment 
of life is fulfi lled through a certain canon of `shall’ and ‘shall not’, 
some hindrance and hostile element on life’s road is thereby removed. 
Anti-natural morality, that is virtually every morality that has hitherto 
been taught, reverenced and preached, turns on the contrary precisely 
against the instincts of life (Twilight of the Idols, “Morality as Anti-
-Nature,” Parts 3–4).
6. Nature and Interpretive Life
Beginning with his turn to natural history, Nietzsche examined nature 
social-historically and social-historical phenomena in relation to their bo-
dily and environmental conditions and circumstances. Genealogy not only 
traces the lineages of morality and religion, it follows the social-historical 
disciplining and shaping, interpretation and transformation, of seemingly 
natural passions, instincts, drives, and desires.
On the basis of the critical model of natural history, Nietzsche can 
diagnose appeals to nature and the natural as ideological products rather 
than consider them as brute primary facts or givens. Nietzsche’s praise of 
naturalness and call to return to the senses, the earth, and the body is not 
40  On the critical potential of Naturgeschichte and the relation between Nietzsche’s earlier 
critique of “critical history” and his later conception of genealogy, see Nelson, Priestly 
Power and Damaged Life in Nietzsche and Adorno, op.cit., pp. 349–356.
41  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 545; GS, 246.
42  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 534–535; GS, 236.
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an appeal to these as fi xed ahistorical absolutes. Th ey are part of developing, 
cultivating, and individuating oneself under and in response to the natural 
and historical conditions of life. Nietzsche is accordingly not only concerned 
with bare life, such as survival, but with its affi  rmation, intensifi cation, and 
cultivation. 
Living is a cultivating and artistic activity; it is Bildung and experi-
mentation in relation to itself, such that nature realizes itself in a life in and 
as art. Speaking of gardening in section 290 of the Gay Science, Nietzsche 
argues that nature is in this sense already “stylized nature,” whether it is 
stylized as conquered, tamed, and useful nature or as an imagined wild and 
free nature43.
Furthermore, Nietzsche advocated extending and furthering natural 
scientifi c inquiry and employed scientifi c naturalistic strategies of explana-
tion and demystifi cation. Yet Nietzsche also warns that “naturalization” is 
reifi cation: 
One should not wrongly reify ‘cause’ and ‘eff ect’, as the natural scien-
tists do (and whoever, like them, now ‘naturalizes’ in his thinking), 
according to the prevailing mechanical doltishness which makes the 
cause press and push until it ‘eff ects’ its end (The Gay Science)44.
Nietzsche’s critique of naturalism, undertaken for the sake of nature and 
life and which is not limited to the mechanistic form of naturalism, is part 
of this project of disenchantment, which includes the demystifi cation or 
dereifi cation of science, positivism, and scientifi c naturalism. Th ese do not 
off er absolute certainties or ideal foundations for either knowledge or life.
If naturalism is considered only to be a methodological or heuristic 
stance, as in recent versions of the naturalistic reading of Nietzsche, this 
is to admit its interpretive character. All naturalisms are interpretations, 
more or less useful fi ctions, and not merely “natural”45. Th e impossibility 
of an exclusive naturalistic stance is suggested by Nietzsche’s analysis of 
the language of physics as intrinsically interpretative. Even the language of 
physics, Nietzsche argued, is philology; and natural laws are intrinsically 
interpretations of nature instead of nature in itself or as such46. Nietzsche 
radicalizes this point by pointing out how the purported “conformity 
43  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 530–531.
44  “Man soll nicht ‘Ursache’ und ‘Wirkung’ fehlerhaft  verdinglichen, wie es die Naturfor-
scher tun (und wer gleich ihnen heute im Denken naturalisiert –) gemäß der herrschenden 
mechanistischen Tölpelei [...]” Nietzsche, KSA 3: 35.
45  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 36.
46  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 37.
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of nature to law” is not only interpretation but bad philology and naïve 
interpretation47.
Naturalism is in this sense distant from the multi-perspectival genera-
tive happening of nature that it obscures through its ideological image of na-
ture. It is not natural insofar as naturalism is another perspectival construct, 
and from the beginning an unacknowledged hermeneutics of nature48.
7. Nature as Art
Th e focus of this paper on the interpretative and artistic understanding 
of nature unfolded in Nietzsche’s writings corrects a number of one-sided 
interpretations. Nietzsche emerges in this account as a hermeneutical and 
methodological pluralist who prioritizes the self-interpretation of life in 
its natural and social contexts and conditions. Th ere is no one conception, 
experience, or worldview of nature that would exclude other alternative 
conceptions and experiences of nature in Nietzsche’s philosophy. Nor can 
naturalism as one heuristic and conditional method or strategy exclude 
other methods or strategies. Th e mixing and play of myriad strategies and 
perspectives characteristic of Nietzsche’s writings reveal the radical plu-
rality and transformative generativity of nature throughout his refl ections 
concerning science and art. Th is means that “nature” is continuous with 
interpretation and art, which are its fulfi llment.
Th e neglect of the poetic and artistic strategies of Nietzsche’s writing 
in naturalistic readings refl ects an impoverishment of Nietzsche’s style of 
philosophizing. Nor is this richness rediscovered by describing Nietzsche as 
a speculative naturalist. Nietzsche is not simply engaged in the scientifi c and 
speculative description of natural phenomena from an external or objectivat-
ing third-person point of view. Th is is, as we have seen, the latent metaphysics 
of contemporary scientism in Nietzsche’s analysis. His work diff ers from such 
scientism and its impersonal ascetic ideal by engaging in the basically herme-
neutical self-refl ection, self-elucidation, and self-formation of a life. Th is is 
indeed the conditional, contingent, and yet still undeniably personal life that 
Nietzsche describes science as serving. Th is is why a text such as Ecce Homo 
is not a set of accidental aft erthoughts but a preeminently philosophical work.
Nietzsche’s “personalism,” however, at best a provisional one in which 
I potentially live and cultivate my life as a work of art without there being an 
underlying nature, essence, or substance of that life. Th at is, it is a heuristic 
or strategic individualism without a substantial self or constitutive subject. 
47  Nietzsche, KSA 5: BGE, §22. 
48  Nietzsche, KSA 3: 626–627.
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Nietzsche’s anti-impersonalism is based in his interpretation of natural 
drives as inherently confi gured, ranked, and interpreted in relation to the 
personality of the individual. Th is is why his reductive physiological expla-
nations of the philosophers in reality reveal what is personal and unique 
about “w h o ” they are. Nietzsche accordingly noted against the impersonal 
prejudice of the philosophers:
In contrast, there is absolutely nothing impersonal about the philoso-
pher; and in particular his morals bear decided and decisive witness 
to w h o  h e  i s  – which means, in what order of rank the innermost 
drives of his nature stand with respect to each other (Beyond Good 
and Evil, §6)49.
My life is constituted in and entangled in the impersonal biological and so-
cial-historical forces of life and all the challenges to identity and self-identity 
that are revealed through Nietzsche’s genealogical analysis of the formation 
of the self. 
Still, the task of poetically and artistically living a life in the face of the 
impersonal forces of one’s life is a more fundamental question in Nietzsche’s 
thinking from the Birth of Tragedy to Ecce Homo than the commitment to 
a scientifi c conception if nature for its own sake. It is in this context of “be-
coming who one is” that Nietzsche’s conception of nature is to be addressed.
8. Conclusion
Nature is depicted as indiff erence, labyrinth, and chaos by Nietzsche. Th e 
dancing star is born out of this chaos. Unlike doctrinal naturalisms that 
attempt to reduce Nietzsche’s multifaceted and radical thinking to a method 
or program, “nature” is not a univocal or unequivocal concept in Nietzsche’s 
writings. Th e “natural” presupposes interpretation to be understood. Our 
conceptions of “nature” are in need of a wider more extended context of art, 
experiment, formation, and interpretation, i.e., of individuation, in a life. 
Th is interpretation of Nietzsche’s conceptualization of nature has several 
signifi cant implications:
(1) On the one hand, naturalism would be anti- or un-natural if it 
involved a denial of its artistic and hermeneutical character insofar as life 
is more than bare or brute nature; that is, living is life affi  rming, creating, 
forming, and interpreting itself. Naturalism is as a result only possible in a 
Nietzschean context as an interpretive art or as hermeneutics.
49  Nietzsche, KSA 5: 19–20; BGE, §6.
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(2) On the other hand, naturalism undermines itself insofar as it 
brackets the equally natural-historical conditions of human existence and 
knowledge, forgets the interpretive and perceptual perspectival character of 
life and knowledge, or abandons the perspectivality, multiplicity, and agonis-
tic confl ict of the interdependent forces of life. Th e dynamic and generative 
confi guration of necessity and meaning in a life indicates the inseparability 
of the biological and the historical in the interpretive formation of the life of 
individuals.
Th e analysis of the mediated and entangled nexus of nature and his-
tory in Nietzsche’s works can be better clarifi ed through his portrayal of 
the feeling of life and its intensifi cation, attenuation, and transformation in 
relation to the forces and conditions of life, which are not simply naturalistic 
insofar as they involve socialization and individuation, and are interpretive 
and artistic in the interpretive context of a singular nexus of life:
Fundamentally, all our actions are altogether incomparably personal, 
unique, and infi nitely individual; there is no doubt of that. But as soon 
as we translate them into consciousness they no longer seem to be 
(The Gay Science, 299–300).50 u
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